Files
AdGuardHome/internal/dnsforward/beforerequest.go
Stanislav Chzhen 3521e8ed9f Pull request 2382: AGDNS-2714-tls-config
Merge in DNS/adguard-home from AGDNS-2714-tls-config to master

Squashed commit of the following:

commit 073e5ec367db02690e9527602a1da6bfd29321a0
Merge: 18f38c9d4 4d258972d
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Wed Apr 16 18:25:23 2025 +0300

    Merge branch 'master' into AGDNS-2714-tls-config

commit 18f38c9d44337752c6d0f09142658f374de0979f
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Fri Apr 11 15:02:00 2025 +0300

    dnsforward: imp docs

commit ed56d3c2bc239bdc9af000d847721c4c43d173a3
Merge: 3ef281ea2 1cc6c00e4
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Thu Apr 10 17:25:08 2025 +0300

    Merge branch 'master' into AGDNS-2714-tls-config

commit 3ef281ea28dc1fcab0a1291fb3221e6324077a10
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Thu Apr 10 17:24:29 2025 +0300

    all: imp docs

commit b75f2874a816d4814d218c3b062d532f02e26ca5
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Mon Apr 7 17:16:59 2025 +0300

    dnsforward: imp code

commit 8ab17b96bca957a172062faaa23b72d5c7ed4d0d
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Fri Apr 4 21:26:37 2025 +0300

    all: imp code

commit 1abce97b50fe0406dd1ec85b96a0f99b633325cc
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Wed Apr 2 18:22:15 2025 +0300

    home: imp code

commit debf710f4ebbdfe3e4d2f15b1adcf6b86f8dfc0d
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Tue Apr 1 14:52:21 2025 +0300

    home: imp code

commit 4aa26f15b721f2a3f32da29b3f664a02bc5a8608
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Tue Apr 1 14:16:16 2025 +0300

    all: imp code

commit 1a3e72f7a1276f9f797caf9b615f8a552cc9e988
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Mon Mar 31 21:22:40 2025 +0300

    all: imp code

commit 776ab824aef18ea27b59c02ebfc8620c715a867e
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Thu Mar 27 14:00:33 2025 +0300

    home: tls config mu

commit 9ebf912f530181043df5c583e82291484996429a
Author: Stanislav Chzhen <s.chzhen@adguard.com>
Date:   Wed Mar 26 18:58:47 2025 +0300

    all: tls config
2025-04-16 18:57:04 +03:00

117 lines
3.1 KiB
Go

package dnsforward
import (
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/aghnet"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/dnsproxy/proxy"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/errors"
"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/log"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
)
// type check
var _ proxy.BeforeRequestHandler = (*Server)(nil)
// HandleBefore is the handler that is called before any other processing,
// including logs. It performs access checks and puts the ClientID, if there
// is one, into the server's cache.
//
// TODO(d.kolyshev): Extract to separate package.
func (s *Server) HandleBefore(
_ *proxy.Proxy,
pctx *proxy.DNSContext,
) (err error) {
clientID, err := s.clientIDFromDNSContext(pctx)
if err != nil {
return &proxy.BeforeRequestError{
Err: fmt.Errorf("getting clientid: %w", err),
Response: s.NewMsgSERVFAIL(pctx.Req),
}
}
blocked, _ := s.IsBlockedClient(pctx.Addr.Addr(), clientID)
if blocked {
return s.preBlockedResponse(pctx)
}
if len(pctx.Req.Question) == 1 {
q := pctx.Req.Question[0]
qt := q.Qtype
host := aghnet.NormalizeDomain(q.Name)
if s.access.isBlockedHost(host, qt) {
log.Debug("access: request %s %s is in access blocklist", dns.Type(qt), host)
return s.preBlockedResponse(pctx)
}
}
if clientID != "" {
key := [8]byte{}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(key[:], pctx.RequestID)
s.clientIDCache.Set(key[:], []byte(clientID))
}
return nil
}
// clientIDFromDNSContext extracts the client's ID from the server name of the
// client's DoT or DoQ request or the path of the client's DoH. If the protocol
// is not one of these, clientID is an empty string and err is nil.
func (s *Server) clientIDFromDNSContext(pctx *proxy.DNSContext) (clientID string, err error) {
proto := pctx.Proto
if proto == proxy.ProtoHTTPS {
clientID, err = clientIDFromDNSContextHTTPS(pctx)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("checking url: %w", err)
} else if clientID != "" {
return clientID, nil
}
// Go on and check the domain name as well.
} else if proto != proxy.ProtoTLS && proto != proxy.ProtoQUIC {
return "", nil
}
hostSrvName := s.conf.TLSConf.ServerName
if hostSrvName == "" {
return "", nil
}
cliSrvName, err := clientServerName(pctx, proto)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("getting client server-name: %w", err)
}
clientID, err = clientIDFromClientServerName(
hostSrvName,
cliSrvName,
s.conf.TLSConf.StrictSNICheck,
)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("clientid check: %w", err)
}
return clientID, nil
}
// errAccessBlocked is a sentinel error returned when a request is blocked by
// access settings.
var errAccessBlocked errors.Error = "blocked by access settings"
// preBlockedResponse returns a protocol-appropriate response for a request that
// was blocked by access settings.
func (s *Server) preBlockedResponse(pctx *proxy.DNSContext) (err error) {
if pctx.Proto == proxy.ProtoUDP || pctx.Proto == proxy.ProtoDNSCrypt {
// Return nil so that dnsproxy drops the connection and thus
// prevent DNS amplification attacks.
return errAccessBlocked
}
return &proxy.BeforeRequestError{
Err: errAccessBlocked,
Response: s.makeResponseREFUSED(pctx.Req),
}
}